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ECONOMICS OF BARTER: AN ASSESSMENT OF BASIC 
ARGUMENTS 
An overall shift to non-monetary exchange informer Soviet Union has become an issue of great 
concern for economists and politicians. Still, this problem has not gain a deep assessment in the 
literature, mainly, because of weak empirical data and short history of the problem. This paper 
"Economics of Barter" presents a critical review of recent studies on non-monetary exchange and 
summary of basic explanations of this phenomenon in order to restate emphases. The idea behind 
this is to show that agents, pursuing their profit- (or rent-) maximizing goals become subject to 
such formal and informal constraints that make them rely upon barter, rather than on monetary 
transactions. 
Introduction 
An overall shift to non-monetary exchange 
in former Soviet Union has become an issue of 
great concern for economists and politicians. 
Still, this problem has not attracted proper 
attention in the economic literature, mainly, 
because of insufficient empirical data and short 
history of the problem. 
The very existence of a large market for 
barter, and its rapid growth during recent decade, 
represents something of a challenge for modern 
economics. The costs associated with finding 
"a double coincidence of wants" was viewed 
by William Stanley Jevons (1875) as motivation 
towards the invention of money. This keystone 
of monetary theory contributes to a widespread 
belief, that barter exchange is necessarily 
inefficient. Impact on prices, and other effects 
of barter were usually analyzed from the 
neoclassical standpoint, which neglects 
institutional matters. Sometimes, such an 
approach does not provide satisfactory 
explanations, especially when institutional 
imperfections take place, namely in transition 
from plan to market. The discussion of 
institutional premises of barter in post-Soviet 
economies represented in recent works of 
Gaddy and Ickes (1998), Commander and 
Mumssen (1998), Kaufmann and Marin (1998), 
and empirical assessments made by Estrin and 
Rosevear (1998), Veronica Orlova (Movchan) 
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(1999) and Aukutsionek (1997) demonstrate a 
growing interest in the problem of barter in 
transition economies. 
In this paper we will not focus on 
consequences of barter, but summarize basic 
explanations of this phenomenon in order to 
identify emphases. The idea behind this is to 
show that barter is nothing but reaction of 
rational economic agents to existing institutional 
environment. Agents, pursuing their profit- (or 
rent-) maximizing goals are subject to such 
formal and informal constraints that make them 
rely upon barter, rather than on monetary 
transactions. 
Definitions 
Non-monetary exchange is broadly defined 
as economic transactions without use of money. 
In post-Soviet countries three basic instruments 
evolved to facilitate non-monetary transactions: 
barter, veksels (promissory notes to pay) and 
vzaemozaliky (offsets). Let us briefly 
characterize each of them. 
There are several definitions to barter. The 
Law of Ukraine "On Taxation of the Profit of 
Enterprises" defines barter as 
.. .economic transaction that includes payment 
for goods or services in other than monetary 
form, including any type of writing-off and 
compensation of mutual indebtedness, when 
money that has to compensate the value of sold 
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goods or services are not received/shown up on 
the account of the seller as a result of operation 
(Law 1994, article 1.19). 
Banks defined barter as "a transaction 
which is bound by a single contract that 
specifies the goods to be exchanged to an 
equivalent value" (1983,160). 
However, it does not merely a pure 
exchange of goods in some proportion. In 
reality, a certain share of value in barter 
t ransact ion is t ransferred in cash on 
commission basis. 
Veksels are the main money surrogates used 
in the post-Soviet countries. Usually 
corporations, banks and governments are the 
issuers of such quasi-monetary instruments. 
Offsets are essentially the transactions 
where debts for goods and services, or taxes, 
are used to clear mutual obligations between the 
enterprises (inter-enterprise payment offsets), 
and between the government and enterprises 
(tax offsets). 
According to Ministry of Finance, in 1996 
the tax offsets represented approximately one 
third of expenditures and revenues of local 
governments in Ukraine. 
In practice, veksels and offsets are widely 
used in various schemes designed to minimize 
taxation in barter deals. 
Barter in Ukraine. 
According to recent data from State 
Committee of Statistics, volume of barter 
amounts to 42.4% of the total industrial product 
sales in 1997 and 42.5% in 1998. 
Reported that their estimate of barter 
constitutes 51 percent to the volume of industrial 
sales. This result was based upon a survey of 
165 barter deals among 55 Ukrainian firms in 
1997. According to this survey, the following 
motives drive enterprises to barter. 
Below we provide some assessment of the 
most discussed explanations of barter, namely, 
tax evasion, lack of circulation assets 
(demonetization) and trade credit argument. 
Pivnenko S.A. Economics of Barter: An Assessment 
Explanations of barter 
Tax evasion argument. 
Opaque nature of a barter deal is viewed as 
major foundation for economic inefficiency. 
Outsiders, including tax authorities, have limited 
ability to monitor the transaction. As in barter 
deal only relative prices matter, two trading 
parties can agree on any nominal price without 
affecting the real exchange rate between the 
goods. Moreover, this rate can be set arbitrarily. 
The ability to manipulate prices provides the 
means for tax evasion, for instance, by 
understating profits. In economic literature on 
barter this is one of the most debated issues. 
Recent studies on FSU economies tend to 
undervalue the importance of the tax evasion 
motive to barter. Basically, the are two common 
arguments for this. 
First, survey results do not report that barter 
is an instrument for tax evasion. Second 
argument was expressed by Commander and 
Mumssen(1998): 
"... there is little evidence that clever 
manipulation of nominal prices in inter-firm barter 
deals has been successfully used for tax 
minimization. Quite to the contrary, most firms 
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believe that inter-firm barter actually increases 
their tax bill. This is corroborated by the 
observation that barter prices almost always 
exceed cash prices, with margins of up to 50 
percent." 
The weakness of both arguments stems from 
unreliable data they were based on. The first 
argument does not seem valid because of 
insufficient level of confidence in survey results 
based upon entrepreneurs' responses to the 
questionnaires. Regarding the legacy of 
communist governance, embodied in the cultural 
specificity of post-Soviet enterpreneurship and 
other behavioral aspects, we can hardly expect 
respondents to jeopardize their privacy, rather 
than sincerely answer the question concerning 
their illegal actions. All in all, let us leave this 
issue opened for the sociological debate and 
concentrate on the second argument. The 
second argument is based on the lower cash 
prices observations. The problem is that those 
prices are not the "true" prices. Below we will 
present some brief analysis of "rules of the 
game" in order to show the ambiguous nature 
of these prices. 
The roots of the problem we can found in 
tax legislation. It is necessary to note that legal 
*Answers have been ranked between very important and irrelevant. The percentages reflect the "very important" 
plus "important" responses. 
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rules on barter taxation are based on the concept 
of zvychainy (normal) prices. In Ukrainian 
legislation there is no clear definition of zvychaina 
price. According to "The Law on Taxation of 
Profits of Enterprises" it is essentially a market 
price of the good traded under "normal market 
conditions". Another regulation, issued by Tax 
Administration, defines zvychaina price as "price 
that was contracted in similar deals, published 
in advertising materials, statistical bulletins or 
estimated in sample survey on prices". 
In Ukraine, four different agencies, namely, 
Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Ministers, 
President's Administration and Tax 
Administration issued different definitions of 
zvychaina price. Some of them are not applicable 
at all. So, bargaining parties can choose an 
appropriate one, which fits a specific deal. For 
example they can set ordinary prices by 
publishing them in price-lists. According to the 
legislation, if actual prices in barter deal are 
lower than zvychainy prices, the latter are used 
as a benchmark for accounting of tax duties. If 
participants of barter deal are willing to 
manipulate prices, the only thing they have to 
do is to coordinate published prices and those 
being used in their barter contract. 
Returning to our discussion, we found that 
understanding of the processes that underlie the 
formation of observed values, in our case, of 
cash prices, may question the argument1. 
To summarize the discussed above, we 
conclude, that there is no strong evidence against 
tax evasion motive for barter. Although barter 
transactions are not properly constrained against 
price manipulation, it does not necessarily mean 
that opportunity of tax evasion is a motivation to 
barter. It is unlikely that net benefits of cheating 
the Tax Administration outweigh the transaction 
costs of non-monetary exchange. 
Now, let us focus on demonetization 
argument, which seems to provide more realistic 
explanation of barter. 
« ' -
Demonetization 
Many economists and businessmen view 
barter as an engine for survival for firms under 
1
 This example presents a good illustration of how 
economic analysis. 
financial crisis and institutional breakdown. On 
the one hand, firms are driven to barter because 
they are short of operation funds (no cash 
available). On the other hand, under given "rules 
of the game", they found rational not to engage 
in cash transactions. Demonetization of the 
economy is the most popular explanation of the 
evolution of non-monetary exchange. This 
explanation includes wide range of arguments 
that stick to macroeconomic and institutional 
roots of this phenomenon. 
Macroeconomic origins of the lack of liquidity 
in monetary system can be generalized as 
follows. Government measures aimed to conduct 
tight monetary policy, with presence of huge 
budget deficit and steady decline in production, 
have led to extremely high interest rates. Bank 
credit to enterprises has declined to extremely 
low level, partially due to the high opportunity 
cost of enterprise crediting, partially due to the 
accumulation of bad enterprise debts in banking 
system. Indeed, during the first years of 
macroeconomic stabilization, government 
excessively borrowed at T-bill market issuing 
bonds with attractive high yields. It is not 
surprising, that banks resorted to bond market 
rather than supply loans to credit market. 
Excessive and unproductive government 
spending crowded out investment in industrial 
sector. Those banks that used to credit to 
industrial sector have soon discovered that most 
of their debtors are insolvent. 
The following problems of institutional origin 
worsened the situation in banking sector and 
skyrocketed interest rates. 
The bankruptcy legislation does not provide 
effective procedure for enterprise liquidation. 
Even if the costly and time consuming 
bankruptcy process is initiated, creditors get 
access to the liquidated assets only after 
obligations to workers and government had been 
repaid. 
The absence of risk-sharing institutions, 
underdeveloped legal institutions for the 
acquisition of assets of insolvent debtors, and 
lack of expertise of banks in risks evaluation, 
ie analysis of the legal rules can effectively supplement 
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all these factors contributed to the significance 
of "moral hazard problem" which has translated 
into unaffordable interest rates. 
Arrears, to a great extent, contribute to the 
lack of operation funds. Being widely discussed 
in economic literature, this problem has deep 
roots, and, sometimes, the distinction between 
causes and consequences is not obvious. 
Here, I would like to emphasize that 
government actions supposed to cure the 
problem, in fact, lead to its worsening. Motivated 
by plausible reasons the government shapes the 
problem by introducing wrong incentives. 
For example, periodic writing-offs and offsets 
campaigns create strong expectations on their 
persistence in future. As a result, firms rationally 
decide to accumulate arrears. 
Other example concerns Kartoteka-2, which 
had been invented for the sake of better tax 
collection. According to this regulation, once 
enterprise was recorded as a tax debtor, it was 
left with only one bank account. Any funds that 
arrive to this account were automatically 
transferred to clear tax obligations. In order to 
maintain production (buy inputs, pay wages), 
enterprise rationally decided to abstain from cash 
and engage in non-monetary transactions. 
All the aforementioned illustrates how 
underdeveloped institutional environment creates 
such an incentive structure that channel 
behavior of economic agents to inefficient 
activities. 
Trade credit argument 
In the literature on this topic, there is a clear 
vision that barter and other forms of non-
monetary exchange have flourished on the 
ground of institutional imperfections. Some 
researchers, while not questioning its inherent 
inefficiency, consider barter as a solution to some 
problems of economic organization in transition. 
This issue is closely related to the legacy of 
economic organization in planned economy. 
Modern economic theory views the Soviet 
economy as a big integrated firm. Central 
planning encouraged direct links between 
enterprises and established stable networks for 
supply and distribution of goods and services. 
However, the supply chains were inflexible and 
slow, many enterprises had only one supplier of 
input and one buyer of output. The Communist 
Party effectively enforced stable and long-term 
relationships and economic discipline2. This 
ensured almost risk-free trade credit3. Typically, 
a trade credit refers to the relations between input 
(or intermediate good) suppliers and producers 
of a final good. Under the central planning the 
maturity of trade credit was usually low, reflecting 
period necessary to clear payments in banking 
system. Hence, the inter-enterprise arrears were 
impossible. Disintegration of the Soviet Union led 
to the breakdown of wide variety of inter-
enterprise linkages, which caused dramatic 
decline in output. Collapse of the communist rule, 
combined with absence of the new enforcing 
institutions, led to the weakening of financial 
discipline. Newly established links highlighted the 
question of creditworthiness of the partners. In 
the imperfect institutional environment and 
disorganized network chains, barter trade can 
provide some advantages. According to 
Commander and Mumssen (1998), spot barter 
can replicate an inter-firm credit. This analogy 
stems from the fact that it takes time to turn 
payment in-kind into cash. When firm sells its 
output in barter deal, it often receives goods or 
services that are difficult to utilize quickly. It takes 
time and effort (cost) to sell the good or money 
surrogates received in barter operations, and use 
them for clearing tax obligations or purchasing 
inputs. Suppose that producer of final good 
arranges a barter deal with its supplier of inputs. 
From the supplier's point of view, he grants a 
credit to the producer, because it takes time to 
him to utilize the received final good. As an interest 
for such a trade credit, some commission cash 
payment can be used. Hence, spot barter, trade 
credit and bank credit, to some extent, can be 
considered as substitutes for provision of working 
capital. 
'Hierarchical structure of the Communist Party constituted the backbone of economic organization, and performed 
a function of solving the "principal-agent problem" 
'Trade credit arises from the period between the time goods are delivered and services performed, and the time 
when payment for these goods and services takes place. 
52 
НАУКОВІ ЗАПИСКИ. Том 15. Економіка 
There is another important advantage of trade 
credit in barter deal. It removes credit risk. 
Indeed, in cash deal there is significant risk that 
producer will fail to pay for inputs in time, or 
will not pay at all. By contrast, in barter deal 
supplier of inputs immediately possesses this 
payment (in the form of a good). 
Normally, the utilization of payment in-kind 
is very costly. If all other firms are cash 
constrained, how could the supplier exercise the 
value of the received goods? According to our 
reasoning, the cashless producer of final good 
can use barter to acquire trade credit from his 
supplier. If this supplier is also cash constrained, 
he has to ask for similar trade credit from his 
own supplier, and so on. Thus, barter trade results 
in reallocation of trade credit along the whole 
chain of production: from producers of primary 
inputs to producers of final products. For 
instance, households provide a credit of similar 
nature to firms by accepting wage arrears and 
wages in-kind. 
The role of industries that produce primary 
inputs (energy and raw materials) would be a 
good issue for further research on barter. 
Intuitively, we can guess that initial inflow of 
credit into production chains originate from 
government subsidies to fuel and energy industry. 
To sum up, trade credit argument suggests 
vision of barter as a response of enterprises to 
the constrained access to bank credit. Yet, it 
explains effects of barter, rather than causes. 
Obviously, such a device for reallocation of trade 
credit helps maintain the production. However, 
it is necessary to note that barter solution for 
the lack of credit has some deficiency. On the 
one hand, barter does not create net credit, but 
redistribute it (Commander and Mumssen, 
1998). On the other hand, it increases transaction 
cost. One source for this is a complexity of barter 
contract. Suppose for example, a final producer 
transfers its product in exchange for inputs. In 
order to quickly liquidate his trade credit, supplier 
of inputs may be tempted to sell the received 
final product on lower prices. It would be more 
costly to constrain such a behavior in the 
contract, if many cases of re-barter take place. 
Concluding remarks 
• Anti-market by its nature, non-monetary 
exchange shades information on a transaction. 
As a result, it distorts signaling role of prices. 
Price mechanism for efficient allocation of 
resources does not work. In bilateral barter deal, 
prices do not reflect the true opportunity costs 
of resources. They result from the mutual 
agreement of the two parties rather than derived 
from decisions of participants at competitive 
market. 
• The phenomenon of barter trade should be 
studied in contingency with other forms of non­
monetary exchange such as veksels and offsets, 
because they almost always supplement barter 
schemes. 
• In any research on transition economy it is 
vitally important to carefully treat any 
observations concerning enterprise behavior. 
• Intransparent nature of barter deal provides 
room for tax evasion. However, there is no 
strong evidence that this is a motivation to barter. 
• Banking crisis and lack of developed 
financial institutions deprive enterprises from 
operation funds, thus pushing them to barter. 
• Inter-enterprise barter deals can provide a 
risk-free trade credit. However, barter does not 
create, but redistributes credit from primary 
input producers to final good producers. 
• Persistent barterization of economic activity 
encourages the development of institutions that 
facilitate non-monetary exchange. There is a 
number of evidences for this: private firms that 
use modern information technologies to search 
partners for barter exchange, state agency that 
mediates in-kind pension payments, various 
clearing agencies and veksel exchanges etc. This 
is an alarming tendency, because greater 
institutialization now promises more problems 
with its removal in future. 
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Півненко С.А. 
ЕКОНОМІКА БАРТЕРУ: ОЦІНКА ОСНОВНИХ 
АРГУМЕНТІВ 
Широке розповсюдження немонетарного обміну в економіках колишнього Радянського 
Союзу викликає все більше занепокоєння економістів і політиків. Однак ця проблема не 
дістала глибокого опрацювання в економічній літературі, значною мірою внаслідок 
ненадійності емпіричних даних і короткого періоду їх накопичення. Стаття "Економіка 
бартеру" пропонує критичний аналіз останніх досліджень з даного питання, а також підсумовує 
існуючі пояснення немонетарного обміну з метою зробити наголос на певних аспектах 
проблеми. Ідея полягає в розумінні сутності бартеру як реакції раціональних економічних 
агентів на інституційне середовище, в якому вони працюють. 
